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Abstract: Digital or computer games have recently attracted the interest of 
education researchers and policy-makers for two main reasons: their interactivity, 
which is said to allow greater agency, and their inherent pleasures, which is linked to 
increased motivation to learn. However, the relationship between pleasure, agency 
and motivation in educational technologies is under-theorised. This paper aims to 
situate these concepts within a framework that might identify more precisely how 
games can be considered to be educational. The framework is based on Zizek’s 
theory of subjectivity in cyberspace, and in particular his notion of interpassivity, 
which is defined in relation to interactivity. The usefulness of this concept is 
explored firstly by examining three approaches to theorizing cyberspace and their 
respective manifestations in key texts on educational game play. Zizek’s analysis of 
cyberspace in terms of socio-symbolic relations is then outlined to suggest how 
games might be considered educational insofar as they provide opportunities to 
manipulate and experiment with the rules underpinning our sense of reality and 
identity. This resembles Brecht’s notion of the educational value of theatre. The 
conclusion emphasizes that the terms on which games are understood to be 
educational relates to the social interests which education is understood to serve.  
 
The value of digital technologies in education is often defined in terms of interactivity, 
which is said to allow learners exercise greater agency and, as a result, sustain more 
pleasurable forms of learning. The Department for Education and Skills’ (DfES) 
consultation paper on e-learning, for example, states that interactive technologies 
“empower learners”, allowing them to take greater responsibility for their own 
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development (2003, p. 7). Digital technologies are also understood to remove constraints 
from teachers, who want to be innovative in the way they teach, as well as education 
institutions beset by financial concerns (p. 8). In this vision of e-learning, interactivity, 
pleasure and agency are fully aligned, with increases in one seen to lead automatically to 
increases in the other two, for all parties involved in education.
As interactive media par excellence, digital games have attracted growing interest from 
education policy-makers and researchers. The e-learning consultation document states 
that games have set a standard for interactive technologies that learners have now come 
to expect from educational software and suggests that game-makers should be 
encouraged to collaborate with education experts to develop tools for schools (DfES 
2003). This follows earlier policy advice issued to game and software developers on 
using game-like interfaces and designs to make educational software more motivating 
and effective (Dawes & Dumbleton 2001; McFarlane et al 2002). Policy bodies have also 
commissioned literature reviews on the use of computer games in UK schools to inform 
decision-making (Mitchell & Savill-Smith 2004; Kirriemuir & McFarlane 2004).
In this paper, I will use Zizek’s writings on subjectivity in cyberspace (1997, 1999a and 
b, 2004a and b) to analyse different articulations of educational play and the ways in 
which they define interactivity, agency and pleasure. As these interrelated concepts have 
tended to be used somewhat loosely and uncritically in the literature on games and 
education, the purpose of using Zizek’s work is to explore them, and the relations 
between them, within a theoretical framework that can identify them more precisely. 
Zizek’s work also enables us to address Cuban’s (1986) point that the problem with much 
of the research on educational technology is that it tends to view technology in technical 
rather than social and cultural terms. To date, much of the debate on games and learning 
has been framed in terms of effectiveness rather than social interest, neglecting the social 
nature of learning and knowledge. In reviewing the various articulations of educational 
play, my intention is to foreground social and political questions and examine how game 
play might be conceptualized as a social practice involving power relations. Zizek’s work 
does not provide a pedagogical solution, but points the way towards how one might be 
imagined to attain certain social, cultural or political goals. This paper will not therefore 
make an argument on the basis of how best to use games in the classroom, but will 
suggest that the way games are used as learning technologies relates to wider social 
interests. 
My focus will be on Zizek’s notion of interpassivity, in particular how it is defined in the 
1999 essay, ‘Is it possible to traverse the fantasy in cyberspace?’. Interpassivity is defined 
in reaction to the more common notion of interactivity, and refers to the way digital 
technologies position people as responders. Zizek’s prime example is the tamagochi, the 
virtual pet that captivates its carers by issuing orders: “the satisfaction is provided by our 
being compelled to care for the object any time it wants – that is, by fulfilling its 
demands” (1999a, p. 107). In contrast to non-digital toys, such as dolls, which are passive 
and pliable, the tamagochi is thoroughly active: “the whole point of the game is that it  
always has the initiative, that the object controls the game” (p. 108 – author’s emphasis). 
It is the process of delegating our agency to the game’s needs that sustains enjoyment.
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Interpassivity is not restricted to cyberspace. Its first formulation was given by Lacan on 
the role of the Chorus in Greek tragedy, which functions as a stand-in for the audience 
whilst displaying the appropriate emotions in response to the drama (Zizek 1997). The 
Chorus takes care of the audience’s response; even if you are not very moved by the 
unfolding tragedy, the Chorus will feel in your place, dispensing you of the need to worry 
about giving the proper emotional commentary. A more recent example is canned 
laughter on television; even though you may not laugh at the jokes, the canned laughter 
does this for you so that you can feel relieved having watched the show (if the canned 
audience enjoyed it, then I must have enjoyed it). The same interpassive logic also 
applies to the notion of the biblical scapegoat (the goat’s sacrifice atones for my own 
guilt) and Tibetan prayer sheets (they pray so I don’t have to). In each case, the activity of 
one entity (the Chorus, the canned laughter, the goat, the prayer sheet) allows for the 
passivity of another. Rather than defining activity and passivity in opposition to one 
another, therefore, they can be seen as mutually constitutive. Interactivity allows me to be 
passive while being active through another (for example pressing buttons translates into 
in-game actions); through interpassivity, I am active while being passive through another 
(I fulfill the game’s demands). Zizek’s notion of interpassivity applies not only in these 
particular incidences, but can also be used more generally to describe the process by 
which we gain a sense of self through relations with others. 
Zizek defines interpassivity in cyberspace in relation to three well established positions in 
the virtual reality literature (1999a). In good psychoanalytic tradition, he analyses these 
arguments in terms of the Oedipus complex, the phenomenon to which all 
psychopathological structures can be traced (Evans 1996). The Oedipus complex is the 
process whereby we come to recognize our place within society as an independent being, 
marked by lack as no longer at one with the mother, whilst identifying with and also 
fearing castration from the father. The father here represents symbolic authority, through 
which we gain access to socio-symbolic signifiers such as language, social status, and 
gender.
The three versions of the contemporary staging of the Oedipus complex in cyberspace 
offer alternative ways of configuring pleasure and agency. In political parlance, they can 
be broadly classified as emancipatory, conservative and postmodern [1]. I will review 
each of these versions in turn and identify how they manifest themselves in the literature 
on games and education. Zizek’s own fourth version, concerned with interpassivity, is 
explored last.
Four versions of cyberspace
Version 1: Games as pain relievers
Version 1 is based on the argument that cyberspace brings about the suspension of the 
Oedipus complex; we no longer recognize external authority (or otherness), which means 
that there is no fixed point from which to define our own subjectivity as both autonomous 
and internally coherent, and consequently to recognize the autonomy and difference of 
others. According to this scenario, cyberspace frees us from the authority of traditional 
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social structures (such as patriarchy, the capitalist work ethic, the class system, ethnicity, 
etc.), and allows us to explore multiple and shifting identities. Identity construction 
becomes a playful activity. It is something we actively define within much looser 
boundaries and is no longer pre-determined by others, or in Lacanian terms, by the 
Symbolic order. This is the deconstructive argument put into practice; the ‘Big Other’ no 
longer confers on us the identity of ‘man’ or ‘woman’ or ‘student’, with the subject 
having gained the freedom to construct his or her identity as an aesthetic endeavour. This 
theme is particularly developed in Turkle’s (1995) exploration of identity on the internet.
In the games literature, traces of this perspective can be found in much of the work which 
concerns itself with the potential of games to change radically the organization of 
education and training, in particular by taking away from education institutions the power 
to determine the pace and style of learning and handing it over to students. One of the 
most vocal exponents of this approach is Marc Prensky (2001), who argues that young 
people, from school students to young employees, are no longer willing to engage with 
traditional forms of instruction which position them as subservient receivers of expert 
tutors. This leads to generational conflict: “The biggest underlying dynamic in training 
and learning today is the rapid and unexpected confrontation of a corps of trainers and 
teachers raised in a pre-digital generation and educated in the styles of the past, with a 
body of learners raised in the digital world of Sesame street, MTV, fast movies and 
‘twitch speed’ videogames” (2001, p. 3). In response, Prensky advocates a ‘revolutionary’ 
approach called digital games-based learning, which is said to have two main benefits. 
Firstly, it offers ‘active learning’, defined in terms of giving greater agency to learners 
who should take responsibility for their progression as well as their self-constitution as 
professionals. Secondly, it makes learning and training fun. For Prensky, the advent of a 
digital economy mean that work and play can no longer be regarded as separate activities. 
This does not mean making learning easy or frivolous. The aim is rather to remove the 
pain of learning and replace it with pleasure: “training and schooling is finally throwing 
off the shackles of pain and suffering which have accompanied it for so long” (p. 4). 
Learning becomes pleasurable, and through immersion in pleasure, we are no longer 
conscious of learning:  “at its very best, even the hard part [of digital game-based 
learning] goes away, and it becomes all fun, a really good time from which, at the end, 
you have gotten better at something, through a process […called] ‘stealth learning’” (p. 
8).
The value of games in education, using Prensky’s line of argument, is that they allow 
learners to retrieve the pleasure of learning, a pleasure they enjoyed as children, which 
was then stolen from them by the authority of formal education and training systems. 
This narrative almost perfectly recreates the Lacanian staging of desire, by which 
jouissance is said to emerge. Within the Lacanian framework, pleasure is associated with 
an original object or state which is then lost of stolen by the Other (Zizek 1989). This 
moment of loss – what might be termed a Fall – means that everything we have since 
then is a by-product rather than the real thing; our current education and training systems 
are poor substitutes for the state of ‘natural’ learning we supposedly experience as 
infants. Indeed a common argument for learning through play is that it is learning in its 
original, natural form, as found in all young mammals, for example in the playful fighting 
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of lion cubs or young monkeys (Sutton-Smith 1997). Retrieval of the original pleasure is 
prevented by the rule of Law [2] or symbolic authority – in this case the disciplinary 
matrix of power that entrenches the authority of education institutions. Desire arises from 
the urge to retrieve the lost object and return to a state of full incestuous gratification 
from which all pain is erased.
The paradox, according to Zizek, is that it is at the precise moment when something is 
experienced as a loss that it becomes pleasurable. So we might say that it is only from the 
perspective of Prensky as an adult trainer than kindergarten learning retroactively appears 
pleasurable and ‘natural’. If we use Zizek’s argument on the economy of pleasure (1989), 
we can also argue that it is only because pleasurable learning is projected as an 
(unrealized) ideal that Prensky’s beliefs about it can be maintained. The obstacles on the 
route towards game-based learning do not prevent its realization but rather maintain its 
desirability as an objective. Far from acting as an oppressive power preventing learners 
from achieving a pain-free existence, the perceived repressive qualities of the education 
system allow Prensky to maintain hope in the liberating potential of game-based learning.
If we follow through the argument that pleasure is defined by its association with an 
inaccessible object, on what basis can game-based learning be pleasurable outside of the 
confines of existing education and training systems? Here we see Prensky challenging 
one form of authority in order to replace it with another – the global economy. Digital 
game-based learning is not only fun, it is necessary, for only those companies who can 
effectively update their employees’ skills using new methods of training will survive. 
Rather than undermining the rule of Law, and thereby giving learners greater agency, 
digital games-based learning, from this perspective, simply re-instates authority 
elsewhere. This supports Zizek’s argument that transgression of the Law serves as its 
ultimate support. It is not only that transgression presupposes the Law it transgresses (the 
wide-ranging benefits of games-based learning presuppose an educational system that 
does not include them), but that the Law relies on its inherent trangression (Zizek 1997). 
So it is precisely Prensky’s playful attitude towards learning which instantiates the 
supremacy of a consumer-oriented and fast-paced brand of capitalism. In freeing learners 
from the shackles of the older generation, Prensky aims to make them better consumers, 
identifying the pleasure of learning and playing in terms of economic necessity. The point 
here is not principally to critique Prensky’s politics but to demonstrate that any argument 
based on the pleasure of learning is dependent on the figure of the Law, whose pleasure it 
is. Pleasure, in the Lacanian framework, is always decentred – it is always somewhere 
else, in another’s possession, with access blocked by some form of authority. In this 
respect, agency and pleasure can be considered to be at odds with each other rather than 
straightforwardly synonymous.
Version 2: Games as sensual temptations
Version 2 is the negative impression of Version 1. Rather than emphasize the liberating 
potential of the post-oedipal libidinal economy, Version 2 is more concerned with its 
negative effects. Cyberspace offers an immersive experience in which there is only a 
stream of sensations and no means of making meaning out of them. As a result, we lose 
the symbolic distance that sustains a minimum of critical and reflective attitude and 
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regress to an almost infantile state. In being submerged in a sea of simulations, we have 
no regard for reality or for rooting our identity in stable fixtures, such as those implied by 
the notion of character, ethics or critique. This theory of cyberspace can be found in 
Baudrillard (Baudrillard & Glaser 1994) and Virilio (1999), and could also be said to 
characterize some of the fears regarding the loss of critical distance in online writing and 
learning, as found, for example, in Birkerts’ Gutenberg Elegies (1994). Zizek (1999a) 
argues that the concern of these theorists is not so much that reality is dissolved or lost in 
some way, but rather that there is no attempt to maintain ‘appearance’ – cyberspace does 
not attempt to mimic reality. Hypertext does not for example follow the rules of the 
realist novel, the tamagochi makes no effort to look like a real pet.
These fears about cyberspace can be detected in some of the policy advice issued to 
teachers and parents on using games for educational purposes. The British Educational 
Communications and Technology Agency (Becta), the UK government agency for policy 
on technology in learning, suggests that when using games as part of classroom teaching, 
teachers should interrupt the play process on a regular basis to prevent students 
immersing themselves in the game and losing sight of the learning objectives: “The 
games interface can be distracting for pupils working to achieve defined learning 
outcomes. Careful structuring by the teacher is required to ensure that pupils are not 
absorbed by game play […]. Insisting that pupils break off from using the game to 
concentrate on other aspects of the lesson requires careful negotiation and a shared 
understanding of the purpose of game use in the classroom” (Dawes & Dumbleton 2001, 
p. 10). Learning is not seen to take place through play but rather through reflection on the 
game’s contents. So in opposition to Prensky, Becta’s position is that it is precisely by 
renouncing pleasure, by stopping play, that gains can be made. This illustrates the 
Lacanian ‘beautiful soul’ argument, in which the very expression of pain gives rise to 
enjoyment; for example, in love poetry, the symbolic articulation of the loss of the loved 
one gives rise to a pleasure of its own (Zizek 1997). Here learning is a pleasure that arises 
through the expression of pain.
Much of the policy interest in games arises from their motivational potential, and from 
the hope that students could be as absorbed by their homework as they are by video 
games. In defining the educational potential of games on these terms, Becta’s argument is 
entirely coherent. Unlike Prensky, Becta’s position acknowledges that as soon as the Law 
– in this case, the authority held by the teacher – tells students to enjoy games, much of 
their appeal will fade. This is because enjoyment is not an immediate spontaneous state, 
but is sustained by an imperative. Being told to ‘enjoy!’ is far more effective as a way of 
hindering access to enjoyment than a direct prohibition from the Law not to enjoy (Zizek 
1999b). The pleasure of gaming could be said to derive not so much from its internal 
structures as from its lack of extraneous purpose (hence the different kinds of pleasures 
afforded by playing games as an amateur and as a professional). A game is to a large 
extent defined by its separation from real life, by its suspension of the social rules that 
govern ever day behaviour. However, if one is told to enjoy a game, it becomes much 
more difficult to take pleasure in it. Becta’s recommendation that teachers insist students 
stop playing games may therefore be the only way of maintaining their transgressive 
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qualities and, as a consequence, their motivational attributes; the pleasure of games needs 
to remain in opposition to the pain of learning.
However, the policy recommendations do not aim simply at providing motivational perks 
but also delivering learning objectives. In the quote above, Dawes & Dumbleton describe 
games as an interface, thereby distinguishing between the visual spectacle of games and 
their ‘real’ educational content, with the former potentially acting as a distraction to the 
latter. For this reason, ‘realistic simulations’ are seen to be most appropriate for classroom 
use. The same point is made in a report on games and education commissioned by TEEM 
(Teachers Evaluating Educational Media) (McFarlane et al 2001). So games like The 
Sims, Sim City or Railroad Tycoon are understood to have the greatest potential for 
teaching budgeting and management skills – whereas the presence of magic spells, for 
example, makes a game inappropriate (McFarlane et al 2001). However, the actions 
performed by the player in games like The Sims are not intrinsically different from, for 
example, the Harry Potter game or any ‘unrealistic’ shooter or role-playing game; in each 
case, success is achieved through the management of resources such as weapons, magic 
beans or skill points. The emphasis put on simulations in the educational games literature 
may not therefore derive so much from their intrinsic content as from their appearance – 
their endeavour to look like reality. It is not only important that students learn to manage 
resources, but that they can be seen to do this. One could go one step further and say that 
the interest that The Sims and other such simulations have generated within education 
research does not stem primarily from their content as from their appearance. The 
emphasis on appearance stems from the need for a counterpoint to reality (Zizek 1999a); 
appearance is necessary to maintain the fiction of something ‘real’ behind it. So one could 
argue that the value of realistic simulations lies not so much in their actual simulation of 
reality as in their ability to sustain a belief in educational content, in a kernel of learning 
hidden behind the appearance of play.
Version 3: Games as replicas of non-virtual life
The third version represents the continuation of the Oedipal narrative by other means. In 
cyberspace, there is more flexibility about the kind of identity one can assume, but in the 
end a choice has to be made – an identity has to be chosen. So for example, in a role-
playing game, there are many kinds of ways in which your avatar can evolve, but you 
will have to choose one of these ways. This points to a certain tension within cyberspace. 
On the one hand, it offers limitless possibilities (you are free to choose a symbolic 
avatar), but on the other, you ultimately have to choose one identity - one which will 
commit you to a certain position, with relations to forms of authority such as patriarchy, 
ethnicity, etc. In addition, the need to commit means that your avatar can never quite fully 
realize your desires, which will be mediated, for example, by what the programme can 
support, how others in the game respond to it, etc. Oedipus online, therefore, is not quite 
Oedipus proper insofar as it promises that ‘everything is possible’ whilst deferring 
gratification and imposing limits on the play of identity – which is clearly why a form of 
‘online identity’ is at all possible (Zizek 1999a).
In What Games have to Teach us about Learning and Literacy, Gee (2003) presents 
games as an instantiation of the best learning principles which the cognitive and social 
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sciences have so far developed. Whereas Prensky, Becta and TEEM focus on the 
specificity of games as learning tools, Gee uses them as an illustrative example of how 
learning should ideally take place in any setting. In this respect, games are just like 
classrooms, only better. Or rather, schools could be as good as games at enabling learning 
if only they could free themselves of the drill-and-test regime implemented by current 
educational policy.
Gee’s argument about games is that they encourage ‘active learning’ by enabling players 
to develop projective identities through their control of an in-game avatar. These 
identities are projects in the making; they develop over time and are defined by the 
player’s values, desires and actions. The way my avatar behaves in a game is a projection 
of my own identity (how I have controlled it) and relates to how I might behave in other 
domains of life; so for example games encourage players to think of themselves as active 
problem solvers who persist in overcoming challenges in the face of failure, which is also 
the sort of identity which schools should call on in developing their students’ identities as 
learners. Learners can engage in active learning because games create a psychological 
moratorium, a space in which the learner can take risks but where real-world 
consequences are lowered. In other words, they create spaces where everything is 
possible and there are no real consequences to playing out one’s chosen projected 
identity. Gee suggests that this is also what schools should achieve. However, if we draw 
on Zizek’s distinction between Oedipus proper and Oedipus online, we might ask about 
the extent to which the possibilities available to one’s online identity can extend to the 
development of one’s offline identity. To phrase it another way, does the fact that we can 
engage in active learning in a game mean that we are able to be more active in the 
construction of one’s identity in the real world? What happens to one’s projected identity 
when the real world consequences are re-instated? In emphasizing the ability of games to 
sustain the play of freely constructed projected identities, Gee’s argument obfuscates the 
constraints of social space in which learning is put into practice. 
Zizek categorises the three versions of subjectivity in cyberspace discussed so far as 
perversion [3] psychosis [4] and hysteria [5] (1999a, p.116). The first version promises that 
games-based learning offers the liberating perspective of globalised pleasurable 
perversion; the second that games entail universal psychotic immersion; and the third is 
based on a model in which game playing divides the subject between the possibility of 
escape from the Other whilst simultaneously countering this with its real world 
impossibility. The articulation of a fourth position is intended to find a middle way 
between seeing cyberspace as radically different from real life (versions 1 and 2) or as 
pretty much the same (version 3). Zizek argues that his own position comes closest to that 
of the pervert. 
Version 4: Games as dramatic stages for reality construction
One of the kinds of pleasures which cyberspace helps to gratify is the desire to be 
passive. Playing a game involves following orders; the game sets the objectives, the 
sequence in which they are to be completed, and usually the winning conditions. In a 
game like The Sims, for example, all that the player does is respond to the needs of the 
different in-game characters. In a shooter game like Deus Ex, the player completes the 
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pre-determined primary and secondary objectives. He or she has some control over how 
to do this, but cannot perform any action that has not already been anticipated by the 
game designer. The pleasure of gaming could therefore be described as being able to ‘do 
what you are told’, in other words, fulfilling the desires of another.
In the Lacanian framework, the drive to fulfill the Other’s desire is what constitutes the 
subject. A subject is not a positive being, it is a fundamental lack, an empty space defined 
not in its own right but in relation to others – or rather in relation to the Symbolic order, 
which refers to the structures of language and social rules with which we make sense of 
reality. The original question at the basis of subjectivity is not ‘who am I?’ but rather 
‘who do you want me to be’, ‘what am I to others’, ‘what do you see in me’? (Zizek 
1989). This is how decentrement is to be understood. What constitutes and guarantees the 
core of my being is located somewhere else than within me. My fundamental fantasies, 
those which enable subjectification, are deprived from me. In aiming to be fully 
ourselves, fully active one might say, we are in fact driven to fulfill the desire of the 
Other (as embodied in social customs and systems of signification).  Hence the 
gratification afforded by gaming, which can therefore be described in terms of 
interpassivity. 
The fantasy to fulfill the Other’s desire is not to be understood as merely subjective, a 
delusion or refusal to see things how they really are.  As Marx argued in relation to the 
commodity and Althusser in relation to interpellation, Zizek (1997) states that fantasy is 
subjectively objective – it is created through social relations but objectively true in that it 
structures our identity. So the interpassive fantasy is not so much a question of what we 
individually believe in, but underpins the material structure of our social relationships, 
our being and therefore our sense of reality.
Interpassivity in cyberspace is different from other instances insofar as it allows us to 
stage our fantasy to fulfill the Other’s desire explicitly. In playing games, for instance, we 
perform actions in the full knowledge that we are doing this within the constraints set by 
someone else. In this respect, cyberspace helps achieve Lacan’s definition of the purpose 
of psychoanalysis. Rather than endeavouring to remove our fantasies and so be ‘more 
fully ourselves’, we should over-identify with them and, in this way, achieve some kind 
of distance from them. Over-identification here refers to the process of following the 
Other’s orders without question or critique, although not without reflexivity. 
Conscientiously performing our fantasies (to fulfill the Other’s desire) disturbs them, 
brings them to the fore, enabling us to achieve some distance towards them, however 
minimal. Of course, this is exactly the process on which gaming is based. Because the 
rules are already set, the goals already decided, we can be playful around them. It is 
precisely in the act of over-identifying with the game designer’s orders, in other words 
the rules of the game, that we recognize them as a game. What defines a game are rules 
which, during the process of play, cannot be changed or critiqued; this is what makes play 
possible, and differentiates games from other activities. Zizek’s point here helps to clarify 
what is distinctive about games as a medium, by challenging the common belief that what 
characterizes computer games is the way they immerse players in an imaginary world, 
where the frame between the game and the real world ideally falls away. We might add 
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that it is this fallacy that has driven the computer games industry to define innovation in 
terms of ever greater graphical realism at the expense of game play (Salen & Zimmerman 
2004). Yet it is precisely the inflexibility of rules which enables the suspension of 
disbelief necessary to play and which makes the gaming situation different from real life. 
Play is possible because we agree to play by rules, and it is it precisely the intransigence 
of rules which highlights their artificiality. 
So what might be the educational dimension of this understanding of gaming? Zizek’s 
suggestion (2004a) is reminiscent of the work of one of the first academic theorists of 
video games, Gonzalo Frasca (2001; 2004), who explores the potential of games to put 
into effect the dramatic theories of Augusto Boal, known as ‘theatre of the oppressed’. 
Boal’s aim is to use theatre to represent reality as socially constructed but open, one of 
several possible outcomes. Theatrical activity should serve as a vehicle to act out 
alternative developments and raise political awareness of the forces at work in the way 
society is organized. Audience and actors co-construct the dramatic performance, altering 
the parameters of the scenario to explore different ways of responding to a given 
situation. Frasca puts Boal’s theories into practice by designing video games intended to 
represent, and allow the player explore, major political issues, such as the war on 
terrorism or corporate political power (see www.watercoolergames.org).
Zizek is similarly interested in the opportunities which cyberspace offers for representing 
the construction of reality, not only from a Marxist perspective but also in the light of the 
Lacanian notion of the virtual nature of reality: “virtualization makes us aware of how the 
symbolic universe as such was always already minimally virtual in the sense that a whole 
set of symbolic presuppositions determine what we experience as reality” (1997, p. 95). 
He draws on Brechtian dramatic theories to explore how cyberspace can enable us to act 
out the fantasmic support of our existence, referring in particular to one of Brecht’s 
‘learning plays’, The Measure Taken (2004a). This is intended for performance by 
amateurs and without an audience on the principle that the moral and political lessons 
contained in them can best be taught by participation in an actual production. The actors 
play all the roles in turn, thereby learning the different subject positions. Brecht’s aim 
was to encourage actors to immerse themselves in the roles without identifying 
emotionally with them – the parts are to be acted out mechanically, as it were, enabling 
critical observation of the patterns of behaviour. Zizek’s point is that cyberspace enables a 
similar demystificatory procedure, by enabling us to enact different subject positions 
mechanically, without identifying with them, and so become aware of the ideological 
presuppositions that make identity possible.
Games require the over-identification with the rules of the game – they have to be obeyed 
(cheating is a transgression which reinforces the supremacy of rules, by reaffirming their 
purpose and status). And it is precisely because we over-identify with the rules that our 
identification with the avatar remains mechanical, at least during actual game play. When 
we kill enemies or cast magic spells in a game, our identification is not with the act of 
killing or using supernatural powers but with gaining extra points. It is not just that we do 
not identify with the in-game characters, it is that we cannot – if we did, we could no 
longer be playful with them, for example, by risking their lives in dangerous situations. 
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What video games enable therefore is the explicit staging of the interpassive fantasy in 
such a way that demonstrates that our sense of reality, both virtual and real, derives not so 
much from its representational content (for example, looking like a soldier or a plumber), 
but from its form (performing the Other’s desire). In this respect, the virtuality, or 
fantasmic basis, of real life is made apparent.
The main difference between Zizek’s version of cyberspace and the other three discussed 
in this paper relates to the notion of identification, or, to borrow Althusser’s term, 
interpellation. Versions 1 to 3 argue for a process of identification that places the player 
inside the game world – cyberspace is portrayed as a virtual space in which another form 
of presence is possible and educationally desirable. Version 4 does not define the value of 
cyberspace in terms of offering players opportunities for self-presence or self-realisation, 
of filling the fundamental lack of the subject, but precisely to highlight the dynamics of 
presence and identity construction. The opposition is similar to that between realist and 
Brecht’s epic theatre. Prensky, Becta and Gee broadly agree that the educational value of 
games lies in the way learners play a virtual role in a virtual environment and that this 
subsequently makes them better able to project themselves into that social role in real 
life. Zizek’s aim is to avoid, rather than encourage, identification with a social role, and, 
as a consequence, bring to light the fantasmic, ideological and contradictory structures 
which sustain our identity and the strategies we deploy to maintain them. Emphasis is 
therefore placed not on social roles but instead on symbolic relations – such as those 
between agency and pleasure, or the self and the Other. The virtue of video games lies in 
their ability to highlight the rules by which reality appears real; the purpose is not just to 
become aware of such rules or to acknowledge their fabricated nature, but precisely to 
treat them in a playful way; to play with the mechanics according to which having a 
consistent and stable identity seems possible and recognize the contingency of the 
objectives which such mechanics are designed to fulfill. This has nothing to do with 
dispelling the illusions on which ‘reality’ is supposedly based or with gaining a critical 
distance from our immersive sensations, but about recognizing the ‘virtual’ (i.e. 
fantasmic) forms of identification which guide our everyday behaviour. In the Lacanian 
framework, this is the only authentic act available to us, and enables what he terms 
‘traversing the fantasy’. The purpose, within this model of learning with games, is the 
same as that of psychoanalysis; to understand how our fantasies structure reality and how 
these might be changed.
A concrete example of how this educational dimension of video games can be put into 
practice is in media education. Here, the emphasis is on studying the media for its own 
sake rather than as a vehicle for curriculum content. In particular, it is the emphasis on 
media production which is most relevant here; in enabling learners to create their own 
games, the processes by which virtual reality is constructed are made explicit and become 
subject to transformation. Rather than positioning students as the objects of the game 
designers’ orders, they themselves become the producers of realities. The ambition here is 
not to ‘lift the veil of ideological illusion’, but to examine the processes by which a sense 
of presence within reality is established and how this motivates different forms of actions. 
In making games, learners explore the parameters for agency, for both game designers 
and players, and how this relates to the pleasure of designing and playing. Here the aim is 
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to study and re-enact the politics of reality construction rather than practice entry into a 
given reality.
Conclusions
Throughout his work, Zizek’s principle interest is in exploring how psychoanalysis 
can become the basis of political practice. In accordance with this, he argues 
that the way we constitute our identity in cyberspace is ultimately a political act 
and is not directly inscribed into its technological properties or some universal 
psychic state. So playing games will not automatically lead me to recognize my 
fundamental interpassive fantasies. Similarly, the objections which Zizek has to 
the first three versions of cyberspace described above are not primarily a result 
of whatever shortcomings or inconsistencies they may have, but stem from his 
own political convictions. When I play games, it is not unreasonable for me to 
say that I am gratifying my desires through sensual immersion with consequent 
loss of stable identity and ethics; when Turkle made much the same claim, she 
was not necessarily being mistaken, or rather to critique her for this tends to 
miss the point. Zizek’s fourth version is not intended primarily to contradict 
Turkle or Baudrillard on the basis of logic but politics. This means that the four 
ways of interpreting the educational dimension of game playing described above 
are primarily political positions. It follows that the consequences of each 
position is open to negotiation rather than understood simply to lead to positive 
or negative consequences.
The implication of course is that ideological action is ultimately located at the psychic 
level. This argument is not specific to Lacan, but can be traced back through Althusser’s 
notion of interpellation to Marx. A potential problem with it is that it reduces politics to 
existentialism, concerned with the constitution of the individual rather than the body 
politic. Zizek seeks to avoid this pitfall by arguing that we should address the full 
implications of the way in which our reality is reproduced through fantasies which are 
essentially dependent on others, which are interpassive. This means that we cannot rely 
on the notion of self-constitution through individual acts. It also means that we each 
contribute to the fantasmic construction of social reality (Daly 1999). What Zizek aims to 
demonstrate is that we are not victims of either unconscious motives or the logic of some 
pre-psychic reality (or what Lacan terms the Real). By traversing the fantasy, it becomes 
possible to recognize existing fantasmic structures and potentially undermine the 
symbolic significatory processes which put them into practice. From this perspective, the 
way we play video games in education becomes a political project that concerns itself not 
with individual pleasures or empowerment, but with the way our collective ‘virtual’ 
reality is maintained.
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1[] I am grateful to Claudia Lapping for this analogy. 
2[] Lacan’s discussion of ‘the Law’ is indebted to the Levi-Strauss’ work on kinship relations, gift-
giving and social pacts, and refers not to a particular piece of legislation or form of authority, but to 
the fundamental principles which underlie all social relations. The Law regulates communication as 
well as sexual and social relations (Evans 1996). There is an analogy between Lacan’s notion of the 
law and Foucault’s concept of power matrices.
3[] Perversion is characterised by actions that aim to deviate from norms in order to disavow the 
authority of those norms. Perversion is associated with fetishism. The fetish is a symbolic substitute 
for the imaginary object of original desire, which is perceived to have existed prior to the 
imposition of norms. The fetish in this case is the digital game. 
 
4[] Psychosis results from a malfunction of the Oedipus complex that results in the lack of the 
paternal function; more specifically, in psychosis the paternal function is reduced to the image of 
the father (the symbolic is reduced to the imaginary). Authority is therefore reduced to a question of 
appearances rather than real effects. Psychosis involves immersion in the imaginary (in other words, 
the visual and the sensual) with no symbolic authority to enable critique and a sense of self separate 
from one’s sensations.
5[] The hysteric is characterized by an obsessive concern with the subject’s identity and where they 
stand in relation to the Other. “The question may be phrased as ‘am I a man or a woman?’ or more 
precisely ‘what is a woman?” (Evans 1996: 78). Here, Gee’s argument can be characterized as 
hysteric in that it is concerned with how students create their identity as learners. Game play, and 
learning more generally, is described in terms of the evolution of identity and social relations – it is 
these matters which interest Gee.   
